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1 Introduction
The importance of entrepreneurship is gaining more attention.1 The prime
arguments to support the creation of new businesses concern innovation,
the expansion of the ‘boundaries of economic activity’ (OECD, 1998b), and
the adaptability of economies towards new opportunities. Governments and
Chambers of Commerce argue that reduced start-up costs for new businesses
are a potential cure for the ailing European labor market.
Reductions in start-up costs can take two forms. One is to reduce the
bureaucratic hurdles that increase the start-up costs for new firms. The
second is to provide institutions for venture capital as well as public financial
support for new firms.2
In this paper we study the implications of lower start-up costs in the
situation that new firms (at least, those with high productivity) can only
be set up by high-skilled persons. Lower start-up costs then aﬀect education
choices by improving the options of skilled workers. This direct skill dividend
to the labor market triggers, through a search externality, a second dividend:
because the odds of getting high-skilled workers to apply for a given vacancy
goes up, already existing firms create more jobs for high-skilled workers. We
provide a model that identifies both these eﬀects.
The current literature on starting firms focuses on the firm level and on
how new firms influence existing markets.3 Our contribution is to endog-
enize education decisions in this framework. Is there, however, any ‘prima
facie’ empirical indication that lower start-up costs are related to educational
choices? Figures 1 and 2 indeed show that two separate measures of start-
up costs, namely the number of days it takes to set up a new firm and the
availability of start-up finance, correlate with education choices.
At the very minimum, these graphs suggest there is some merit in further
investigating a positive link between low start-up costs and incentives for
1See for example the Comission of the European Communities (1999) and the OECD
(1998a, b).
2Another aspect of venture capital and its eﬀect on labor markets is discussed theoret-
ically and empirically by Belke et al. (2003). They argue in a matching framework that
the availability of venture capital helps to select better managers.
3Much empirical research can be found on these issues. To name two examples: Au-
dretsch et al. (1999) study industry dynamics and how the survival of new firms depends
on start-up costs as well as industry characteristics. Gans et al. (2002) look empirically
at the eﬀects of start-up costs on the trade in ideas, innovation, and the founding of new
firms in an industry.
1
ARG
AUS
AUT
BEL
BOL
BRA
BGR
CAN
CHL
CHN
COL
CRI
CZE
DNK
ECU
EGY
SLV
FIN
FRA
DEU
GRC
HKG
HUN
ISL
IND
IDN
IRL
ISRITA
JPN
JOR
KOR
LUX
MYS
MUS
MEX
NLD
NZL
NOR
PER PHL
POL PRT
RUS
SGP
SVK
ZAF
ESP
SWE
CHE
THA
TUR
UKR
GBR
USA
VEN
VNM
ZWE
0
20
40
60
80
Te
rti
ar
y 
en
ro
lm
en
t r
at
e/
Fi
tte
d 
va
lu
es
2 3 4 5 6
Venture capital easy to get, WEF
Tertiary enrolment rate Fitted values
Venture capital and Tertiary School Enrolment
 
Figure 1: Venture Capital and Tertiary School Enrolment (Sources: UN
World Development Indicators and Porter et al., 2000)
high-skilled education.
Our matching model is in the vein of Pissarides (2000) and Fonseca et al.
(2001). In equilibrium, high-skilled workers first search for a high-skilled va-
cancy with existing firms. Search frictions prevent a perfect match between
high-skilled vacancies and high-skilled job seekers. Some high-skilled unem-
ployed then opt for setting up new firms until the value of outside low-skilled
employment equalizes the value of creating a new firm. The equilibrium
proportion of high-skilled vacancies is then determined by the proportion of
high-skilled workers in the pool of unemployed, which links the proportion
of high-skilled vacancies with the outside option for high-skilled workers of
setting up a new firm. This gives rise to a matching externality: a larger
share of high-skilled workers will increase the profitability of posting a high-
skill vacancy for existing firms. This increases the number of high-skilled
vacancies created when start-up costs for new firms decrease. Through this
‘thick market externality’ higher education rates lead to more job creation
for high-skilled workers and this again adds to the incentives to invest in
education. Under the specific assumptions of our model, lower start-up costs
increase production and reduce the number of workers filling low-skilled jobs.
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Figure 2: Time to Start a Firm and Tertiary School Enrolment (Sources: UN
World Development Indicators and Djankov et al., 2002)
Closest to our approach is Fonseca et al. (2001) who study the eﬀects
of start-up costs in a matching model where workers are heterogeneous with
respect to the potential profit of starting a new firm. Whilst not considering
education, they also argue that lower start-up costs lead to more firms being
created and less unemployment. The eﬀect of reducing start-up costs on the
eﬃciency of the market is ambiguous in their model: if too many workers
start new firms, the workforce may become too small and output suﬀers. In
contrast, lower start-up costs are always beneficial for the economy in our
model.
A related line of enquiry is the link between education choices and search
frictions. Acemoglu (1996) provides the basic intuition: workers decide on
their investment in education before knowing whether they are able to find
a high-skilled job. A higher proportion of educated workers then leads to
more firms creating such jobs implying a wedge between private and social
returns to education. Burdett and Smith’s (2002) ‘low skill trap’ is based on a
similar intuition: they provide a model with search frictions in which multiple
equilibria exist, where firms oﬀer either too few or too many high-skilled jobs
3
and workers either acquire or refrain from acquiring skills.4 Where these
papers diﬀer from ours is that in our model search frictions are bounded by
the option of setting up one’s own firm.
Other policy options that aﬀect the education choice of individuals are
considered in the matching literature. Belot (2003) models education choices
and migration options in case of labor market frictions. She argues that poli-
cies that increase migration possibilities also increase the incentives to invest
in education. Another policy option is unemployment insurance, which eﬀec-
tively reduces the importance of unemployment risks and hence stimulates
the unemployed to look for higher-paying riskier jobs. Acemoglu and Shimer
(1999) show that unemployment insurance can thus be output increasing
when the unemployed are risk-averse. When the possibility of taking a risky
jobs is related to particular education choices, unemployment benefits aﬀect
education choices.
Our baseline model presented in Section 2 captures the basic search-
friction argument. In Section 3, the baseline model is extended with the
opportunity for high-skilled persons to start a new firm. We discuss and
interpret the comparative statics of the model. We also provide a short
discussion on the diﬀerences between policies to reduce bureaucratic hurdles
vs. policies to provide venture capital. Section 4 contains empirical evidence
that supports the main prediction of our model, namely the positive eﬀect
of start-up costs on skill acquisition. Section 5 concludes. All tables can be
found in the Appendix.
2 A Matching Model with Education
2.1 The Basic Model
The economy consists of a fixed large number of firms and N workers. We
consider a matching model with two time periods. In period one the workers
in the economy decide whether they enroll in education and firms choose the
number of vacancies for high and low-skilled jobs. In the second period, firms
and workers are matched and production takes place.
4Masters (1998) studies the diﬀerences between wage bargaining and fixed rent sharing
agreements in a model with investment by firms in capital and investment by workers in
education. He finds that ineﬃciencies in the market have to be attributed to both search
frictions and ineﬃciencies in the determination of wages.
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With respect to the cost of education, workers have an innate ability
θ ∈ [0; 1]. Ability is distributed over the population following a continuous
cumulative distribution function Q(θ) on the support of [0,1]. Workers that
choose to invest in education incur a cost of e(θ). By assumption, higher
ability individuals have lower costs of education, i.e. de(θ)
dθ < 0. To guarantee
an interior solution we assume that education is free for the most gifted
worker (e(1) = 0) and impossible to achieve for the least gifted (e(0) =∞).
In all subsequent arguments, this will lead to a cut-oﬀ ability z above which
workers become educated and below which they do not. Then, 1 − Q(z) is
the share of workers becoming educated.
Firms can oﬀer two types of jobs: low-skilled jobs and high-skilled jobs.
To post a low- (high-)skilled vacancy imposes costs of cl (ch) on the firm. We
denote the overall number of vacancies as Vl and Vh. Low-skilled jobs can be
performed by any type of worker whereas high-skilled jobs can only be filled
by high educated workers. Matching individuals to high-skilled jobs is by
assumption more diﬃcult than matching individuals to low-skilled jobs. For
simplicity, we assume frictionless matching on the low-skill labor market, i.e.
there is a spot-market for low-skilled jobs. The number of low-skilled matches
equals Ml = min{Nl;Vl}, where Nl and Vl refer to the number of workers
seeking low-skilled jobs and the number of low-skill vacancies, respectively.
Think of low-skilled jobs as hamburger-flipping positions which can be found
at virtually no cost at all.5
With respect to high-skilled jobs we assume that matching frictions are
captured by a constant returns to scale matching function m(Nh, Vh). The
number of educated workers Nh is equal to (1−Q(z))N . The number of suc-
cessful high-skilled matches equals Mh = m((1 − Q(z))N, Vh). Unsuccessful
educated workers enter the low-skill labor market, which means we assume
matching first takes place for high-skilled jobs and then for low-skilled jobs.
The number of individuals prepared to accept low-skilled jobs thus equals
N −Mh.
A successful match has productivity pl, ph respectively. We assume that
wages in successful matches are determined by instantaneous Nash-bargaining
where the power of workers is independent of education and equals β: wages
are given as wl = βpl and wh = βph. To ensure that production takes place
5Assuming frictions on the market for low-skilled labor does not change the basic story
because an increased probability of unemployment merely increases the value of the option
to start a new firm.
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we assume (1− β)pj > cj, j ∈ {l, h}. If this would not hold, there would be
no low-skilled (high-skilled) workers at work, which is a trivial case.
2.2 Analysis of the Basic Model
We start with the behavior of firms with respect to low-skilled jobs. Firms
will obviously set up low-skilled vacancies when there is a surplus in doing
so. This is the case given the assumption on productivity: (pl − wl) is by
assumption bigger than cl. To maximize profits, firms will post vacancies
as long as the marginal expected profit is non-negative. This ‘free entry’
condition for low-skilled vacancies implies that the number of posted low-
skilled vacancies solves
N −Mh
Vl
(pl − wl)− cl = 0. (1)
The solution is Vl = N−Mhcl (pl − wl). This must be higher than N −Mh
because pl − wl > cl, which shows that there is an over-supply of low-skilled
vacancies. This is rent-dissipation.
The number of individuals who choose to become educated is determined
by the condition that the marginal individual is indiﬀerent between becoming
highly-educated or not. The equation determining z is given as
m((1−Q(z))N, Vh)
(1−Q(z))N (wh − e(z)) + (1−
m((1−Q(z))N, Vh)
(1−Q(z))N )(wl − e(z)) = wl
(2)
For the firm, setting up a marginal high-skilled vacancy must have zero-
profits, which implies
m((1−Q(z))N, Vh)
Vh
(ph − wh) = ch (3)
The following proposition states the result for the basic model.
Proposition 1 In the basic model with education and low- and high-skilled
jobs there exists a unique equilibrium, described by a set {V˜h, V˜l, ez} where
V˜h, V˜l, ez denotes the equilibrium number of high- and low-skilled vacancies
and the cut-oﬀ ability respectively.
Proof. The proof runs via standard arguments: The productivity and the
bargaining power uniquely determines Vl. Equations (2) and (3) determine
6
eVh and ez. Only one solution exists because for a given z, the marginal profit
of an extra vacancy for high-skilled is monotonically decreasing in Vh. This
implies there is only one (finite) level of Vh for any given z. Finally, the
value of becoming high skilled is monotonically increasing in θ because of
the decreasing education costs. Because of the assumptions on e(.), there
will be a unique level of z at which an individual is indiﬀerent. This level isez. In the simple model we hence have a unique equilibrium set {V˜h, V˜l, ez}.
3 Business Start-ups
3.1 Model Extension
We introduce the possibility for educated workers to start a business. The
type of business we have in mind is obviously one with high productivity.
This means we abstract from ‘new firms’ that are actually a form of low-
skilled employment such as street vending.
An individual setting up his/her own high-skilled production job has to
bear the cost SC. We assume that firms are more eﬃcient in setting up
such jobs than the unemployed are and that β is large enough such that
accepting a high-skill job in a firm is more attractive to an educated worker
than to start a business: wh > ph−SC or SC > (1−β)ph. This assumption
implies SC > ch, which reveals the intuition for the existence of firms in
this economy, namely that economies of scale exist: a firm is more eﬃcient
than the unemployed in creating new jobs. To ensure that starting a firm is
attractive for an educated worker in case of being hit by labor market friction,
we assume wl < wh − SC or SC < β(ph − pl). Otherwise the new option
of starting a business has no value because educated workers prefer to work
in a low-skilled job rather than setting up a new firm. To summarize: we
consider the case where the option to start a firm is attractive to an educated
worker hit by labor market frictions: wh > ph − SC > wl. All other cases
are trivial.
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3.2 The Value of Starting a New Firm
For the analysis, this new option changes the marginal condition (2) such
that in equilibrium the following needs to hold
m((1−Q(z))N, Vh)
(1−Q(z))N (wh−e(z))+(1−
m((1−Q(z))N, Vh)
(1−Q(z))N )(ph−SC−e(z)) = wl.
(4)
This reveals the mechanism highlighted in this paper: becoming a high-
educated individual is now more attractive because of the outside option of
opening a new firm. This will unequivocally push down the equilibrium levelez. This, in turn, will push up the value of a high-skilled vacancy for existing
firms, which means more high-skilled vacancies will be created, which will
again increase the value of becoming high-educated. Hence, V˜h will increase.
We summarize this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Giving mismatched educated workers the option to start a
new business leads to a larger share of workers acquiring education and to an
increase of high-skill vacancies over the basic model.
Proof. The result follows from the previous proof. By assumption ph−SC >
βpl hence the e(z) solving equation (4) must be larger than the e(z) solving
(2), hence Nh is increasing. That eVh increases follows from the monotonicity
of eVh with respect to Nh.
To study the eﬀects of reduced start-up costs, we consider the comparative
statics of an decrease in SC.We proceed by stating the result of the analysis
in a proposition.
Proposition 3 A reduction in start-up costs (SC) implies a higher rate of
education and more vacancies for high-skilled jobs.
Proof. The comparative statics yield the following equations:
[4ez ∂∂ez+4V˜h ∂∂V˜h ][m(1,
V˜h
Nh
)(wh−pl+SC)+pl−SC−e(ez)] = (1−m(1, V˜h
Nh
))4SC
(5)
4ez ∂∂ezm(NhV˜h , 1) = −4V˜h
∂
∂V˜h
m(
Nh
V˜h
, 1) (6)
8
which immediately reveals signs: because ∂∂V˜hm(
Nh
V˜h
, 1) < 0 and ∂∂ezm(NhV˜h , 1) <
0, it follows that 4V˜h and 4ez have opposite signs. Manipulating the equa-
tions further, we obtain
4ez
4SC =
(1−m(1, V˜h
Nh
))
[
∂m(1, V˜h
Nh
)
∂ez + − ∂∂ezm(
Nh
V˜h
,1)
∂
∂V˜h
m(
Nh
V˜h
,1)
∂m(1, V˜h
Nh
)
∂V˜h
](wh − pl + SC)− e0(ez)
(7)
4V˜h = 4ez− ∂∂ezm(NhV˜h , 1)∂
∂V˜h
m(Nh
V˜h
, 1)
(8)
Now, in the formula for 4ez4SC , the terms with ∂m(1, V˜hNh )∂ez and e0(ez) are both
positive, which shows that 4ez4SC > 0. The feedback-eﬀect via the negative
term
− ∂
∂ezm(NhV˜h ,1)
∂
∂V˜h
m(
Nh
V˜h
,1)
∂m(1, V˜h
Nh
)
∂V˜h
then increases 4ez4SC again.
The analysis also shows how the first-order eﬀect of the increased prof-
itability of education with the advent of the outside option is amplified by the
second-order eﬀect of the increased number of vacancies that firms provide
as a reaction to the increase in the number of applicants. It embodies the
matching externality.
4 Some empirical evidence
The main prediction that our model generates is that lower start-up costs
increase the number of individuals opting to become educated.
As an empirical indicator of such human capital formation we use data on
educational enrolment from the UN World Development Indicators. These
are available for a large cross-section of countries. Data on start-up costs
come from two diﬀerent sources: the Global Competitiveness Report (Porter
et al. (2000)) and Djankov et al. (2002). In the Global Competitiveness
Report executives in diﬀerent countries were asked ‘whether venture capi-
tal was easy to get’.6 Djankov et al. (2002) constructed an international
6Venture capital in our model makes it easier for educated individuals to set up their
own firm. The main role of venture capital in the literature is to lower ch, i.e. to make it
9
database that quantified the regulation of entry of new firms. They went to
considerable lengths to collect national information on the costs of starting
a new firm, including the number of procedures, and the time and cost of
obtaining legal status. They not only checked the available written informa-
tion but also contacted the relevant government agencies in the countries and
commissioned independent reports on entry regulation from local law firms
as well. Both the venture capital data and the regulation of entry data exist
only for the year 1999.
Figure 1 of the Introduction showed the relation between the ‘ease in
obtaining venture capital’ and tertiary school enrolment for 58 countries.
These indicators show a very high correlation of 0.69. Likewise, the variable
‘log(days to obtain legal status)’ shows a very significant negative correlation
with tertiary enrolment for 83 countries7 - see Figure 2. Very similar relations
are obtained for secondary school enrolment rates.8
Table 1 shows correlations between our two schooling indicators and four
diﬀerent indicators for start-up costs: the venture capital indicator, time
needed to get legal status, costs associated with obtaining legal status and
the number of procedures which are necessary to start a firm. All of these
indicators are highly correlated with each other and with school enrolment.
Looking beyond simple correlations, we now try to explain school enrol-
ment Ei using more variables. The included variables are an indicator for
start-up costs or venture capital (V ENi) and some control variables: GDP
per head (Yi), total public spending on education (PUBi)9, the illiteracy rate
of adult males (ILi), the unemployment rate of youths (Ui), and an indicator
easier for existing firms to create high-skilled vacancies such as via the financing of R&D
activities of old firms.
7The countries in the samples are: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Bourkina Faso, Bulgaria, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech
Rep., Denmark, Dominican Rep., Egypt, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Ko-
rea, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysisa, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Mo-
rocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovak Rep., Slove-
nia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia,
Turkey, Uganda, Ucraine, UK, US, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
8Enrollment rates are gross enrollment rates; i.e. the number of students divided by
the relevant population, which might result in enrollment rates of more than 100% for
secondary education.
9See e.g. Winter-Ebmer and Wirz (2002) for the relation between pubic funding and
enrolment into higher education in Europe.
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for the share of urban population in the country (URBi). It can be argued
that all of these variables influence school enrolment directly. The illiteracy
rate of adults takes account of the intergenerational correlation in education
enrolment which is well documented in the literature (Solon, 1999); the un-
employment rate of youths can be seen as an indicator of the opportunity
costs of youth while deciding about further education; a higher share of the
population living in urban centers indicates both a general level of develop-
ment and the availability of schooling institutions. Table 6 in the Appendix
shows descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the analysis.
OLS results for tertiary enrolment are in Table 2 whilst those for sec-
ondary enrolment are found in Table 3. In both tables we experiment with
the four diﬀerent indicators for start-up regulation or venture capital shown
above. The results are remarkably similar across specifications. Our indica-
tors for start-up regulation always have the right sign and are statistically
significant most of the time. The assessment by executives if ‘venture capital
is easy to get’ varies in the data between a low of 1.9 and a high of 6.4.
Increasing this assessment by one standard deviation (1.05) would increase
tertiary enrolment by almost seven percentage points. The quantitative ef-
fect of registration time is somewhat smaller: decreasing the time necessary
to obtain legal status by one standard deviation of our data set (60 percent)
would increase enrolment by 3.6 percentage points. The eﬀects of the other
variables always have the anticipated sign, but lack statistical significance in
many cases; only the coeﬃcient of GDP is always statistically significant.
4.1 Robustness analysis
One potential problem with these results is the possibility of missing con-
founding variables or the endogeneity of start-up costs. It could be the case
that both school enrolment as well as start-up regulation are caused by third
factors like the climate towards entrepreneurship. As an attempt to deal with
such problems, we instrument start-up costs by political variables which we
assume to aﬀect start-up costs directly but school enrolment only indirectly.
The essential reason for this is that political choices can almost immediately
aﬀect start-up costs, but not directly education enrolment: in the short-run,
enrolment levels are the result of the choices made by students and not gov-
ernment which makes the eﬀect of political decisions indirect in the short run
at least. As our instruments we use data on the political system from Botero
11
et al. (2003) and Djankov et al. (2002).10
Tables 4 and 5 report our estimates for the diﬀerent start-up indicators.
To test for the relevance of our instruments, we include indicators for the
goodness of fit of the first-stage regressions, i.e. the marginal R2 and the
F-Test for the excluded instruments. The explanatory power of the instru-
ments is quite good, though less so for the venture capital indicator.11 The
coeﬃcients for the start-up costs in the IV specification are fairly similar
to the OLS results. The coeﬃcients are of comparable size and six out the
eight relevant coeﬃcients are statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
It has to be said, though, that the null hypothesis that all instruments are
orthogonal to the error term in the second stage (the Sargan-test for overi-
dentification) fails in some cases, especially for secondary school enrolment.
The results for secondary school enrolment should therefore be interpreted
with care.
5 Conclusions and discussion
The present paper attempts to shed new light on the discussion about start-
up costs for new firms. Whereas the standard argument in favour of lower
start-up costs is that mismatched workers can then start their own firm, we
argue that lower start-up costs also provide incentives for education. This
is because new firms (at least those with expansive potential) are often set
up by high-skilled workers. Lower start-up costs therefore not only increase
production but also lead to a higher proportion of individuals choosing high-
skilled education. In the presence of search frictions this improvement in the
skill-composition of the labour force can furthermore increase the number of
high-skilled vacancies. A corollary is that incumbent firms - who are supposed
to lose in general from increased competition - can also gain from reduced
start-up costs via the skill-composition eﬀect that reduces the tightness of
the job-market for high-skilled labor.
10These include: 1) Party aﬃlliation: the percentage of years between 1975 and 1995
during which the party of the chief executive and the largest party in congress had leftist
orientation; 2) Indicators for the origin of the legal system; 3) An indicator for autocracy
indicating the ‘general closedness of political institutions’; and 4) an indicator for property
rights.
11This might be due to the fact, that - while the venture capital indicator relates to
the financial infrastructure of the country - the other three indicators are related to legal
circumstances which are more responsive to political and legal factors.
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The empirical evidence on the eﬀects of start-up costs on enrolment, which
bears the usual caveats of being qualitative and available for few periods,
strongly supports our model. Increasing the assessment of managers as to the
ease with which venture capital is available by one standard deviation would
increase tertiary enrolment by almost seven percentage points. Decreasing
the time necessary for a new firm to obtain legal status by one standard
deviation would increase enrolment by 3.6 percentage points.
Our results, if accepted, also reflect upon the discussion of whether edu-
cation actually provides skills or just a signal of ex-ante existing skills. The
present theoretical model assumes that education improves the skill level of
a worker and has no signalling function. In a signalling model of education,
workers need to provide the education certificate to signal their quality; no
such signal is needed to be your own boss. Lower start-up costs in a signal-
ing context would therefore reduce the incentive for (ex-ante) high-potential
individuals to invest in the signal. Then, empirical evidence should reveal
that lower set-up costs lead to lower tertiary education rates. The presented
empirical evidence strongly suggests otherwise and hence supports the theory
that at least some skill acquisition takes place during education.
13
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Appendix: Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Correlation between Start-Up Indicators and School Enrolment 
  Venture 
capital 
ln(time) ln(cost) ln(steps) Sec. en-
rolment 
Tert. en-
rolment 
Venture capital easy to 
get 
 
1.0 
     
Ln (time to get legal 
status) 
 
-0.60 
 
1.0 
 
  
   
Ln (cost to get legal 
status) 
 
-0.56 
 
0.62 
 
1.0 
   
Ln (number of steps to 
get legal status) 
 
-0.64 
 
0.83 
 
0.64 
 
1.0 
  
Secondary School 
enrolment rate 
 
0.68 
 
-0.50 
 
-0.60 
 
-0.47 
 
1.0 
 
Tertiary School 
enrolment rate 
 
0.69 
 
-0.55 
 
-0.60 
 
-0.46 
 
0.82 
 
1.0 
Correlations including venture capital relate to 53 observations, all others to 82 
observations. 
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Table 2: Tertiary School Enrolment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Venture capital easy to get 6.953    
 (2.721)*    
 
Ln (time to obtain legal status)  -4.760   
  (1.707)**   
Ln (cost to obtain legal staus)   -2.315  
   (1.319)  
Ln (number of steps to     -4.727 
obtain legal status)    (3.141) 
Unemployment rate youths 0.219 0.195 0.186 0.165 
 (0.184) (0.121) (0.132) (0.124) 
Illiteracy rate male adults -0.233 -0.120 -0.073 -0.106 
 (0.155) (0.085) (0.091) (0.088) 
Public expenses for education 0.847 1.218 1.155 1.195 
 (1.076) (0.763) (0.815) (0.818) 
Ln (gdp per head) 5.711 7.192 7.485 7.743 
 (2.562)* (1.351)** (1.429)** (1.400)** 
% urban population 0.121 0.142 0.137 0.152 
 (0.138) (0.095) (0.098) (0.099) 
Observations 53 83 82 83 
Adjusted R2 0.60 0.70 0.68 0.68 
Standard errors in parentheses,  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
 
 
Table 3: Secondary School Enrolment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Venture capital easy to get 9.765    
 (4.148)*    
Ln (time to obtain legal status)  -5.948   
  (2.864)*   
Ln (cost to obtain legal status)   -4.292  
   (2.137)*  
Ln (number of steps to     -9.130 
obtain legal status)    (5.131) 
Unemployment rate youths 0.573 0.368 0.446 0.346 
 (0.280)* (0.203) (0.214)* (0.203) 
Illiteracy rate male adults -0.137 -0.359 -0.252 -0.346 
 (0.237) (0.143)* (0.148) (0.144)* 
Public expenses for education 1.000 2.280 1.893 1.994 
 (1.641) (1.281) (1.321) (1.336) 
Ln (gdp per head) 8.439 11.819 11.519 12.019 
 (3.906)* (2.268)** (2.316)** (2.287)** 
% urban population -0.000 0.143 0.136 0.168 
 (0.210) (0.159) (0.159) (0.161) 
Observations 53 83 82 83 
Adjusted R2 0.54 0.68 0.66 0.67 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 4: Tertiary School Enrolment – IV estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Venture capital easy to get 7.161    
 (3.977)    
Ln (time to obtain legal status)  -5.085   
   (2.024)*   
Ln (cost to obtain legal status)   -5.002  
    (2.248)*  
Ln (number of steps to obtain    -7.422 
legal status)    (3.774)* 
Observations 51 77 78 78 
Marginal R2 0.40 0.37 0.46 0.57 
F-test 1.49 2.35 3.54 5.50 
Sargan overid 24.82 13.43 17.58 17.07 
prob >chi2 0.02 0.42 0.17 0.20 
Other variables as in Tables 2 and 3, standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
Table 5: Secondary School Enrolment – IV estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Venture capital easy to get 1.331    
 (6.582)    
Ln (time to obtain legal status)  -9.450   
   (3.344)**   
Ln (cost to obtain legal status)   -4.823  
    (3.878)  
Ln (number of steps to obtain    -14.044 
legal status)    (6.293)* 
Observations 51 77 78 78 
Marginal R2 0.40 0.37 0.46 0.57 
F-test 1.49 2.35 3.54 5.50 
Sargan overid 22.26 24.18 21.40 17.78 
prob >chi2 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.16 
Other variables as in Tables 2 and 3, standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics and data sources 
 Source Mean Standard 
Dev. 
Tertiary enrolment rate  WDI 31.62 21.68 
Secondary enrolment rate  WDI 78.73 34.97 
Easyness of venture capital  Porter et al. 3.96 1.03 
Cost of obtaining legal status, log Djankov et al. -1.57 1.36 
Time to obtain legal status, log  Djankov et al. 3.58 .91 
# of procedures to obtain legal status, log Djankov et al. 2.24 .51 
Youth unemployment rate ( 15-24 years) WDI 17.69 10.64 
Illiteracy rate total adult males WDI 14.03 16.31 
Public spending on education as a % of GDP  WDI 4.48 1.86 
GDP per capita, log WDI 7.98 1.63 
Urban population,  % of total WDI 62.22 21.15 
Chief executive‘s party has left orientation 
1975-1995  
Botero et al. .50 .37 
Chief executive‘s party has center-left 
orientation 1975-1995 
Botero et al. .640 .37 
Largest party in congress has left orientation 
1975-1995 
Botero et al. .557 .39 
Largest party in congress has center-left 
orientation 1975-1995 
Botero et al. .684 .36 
Legal origin, French  Djankov et al. .397 .49 
Legal origin, Socialist  Djankov et al. .217 .41 
Legal origin, Scandinavian  Djankov et al. .051 .22 
Legal origin, English  Djankov et al. .269 .44 
Autocracy: general closedness of political 
institutions between 1945 and 1998, 0 lowest 
and 10 highest 
 
Djankov et al. 
 
3.408 
 
2.60 
Property Rights, Index (0-1) Djankov et al. .663 .24 
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